Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can We Trust States with ‘Drone Federalism’? by Gruber, Robert H.
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 4
2015
Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can We Trust
States with ‘Drone Federalism’?
Robert H. Gruber
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Gruber, Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can We Trust States with ‘Drone Federalism’?, 21 Rich. J.L. & Tech 14 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol21/iss4/4
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 4 
 
1 
 
COMMERCIAL DRONES AND PRIVACY: CAN WE TRUST 
STATES WITH “DRONE FEDERALISM”? 
 
Robert H. Gruber* 
 
Cite as: Robert Gruber, Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can We Trust 
States with “Drone Federalism”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2015), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i4/article14.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Judge Andrew Napolitano said recently of unmanned aircraft 
systems (“UAS”), or “drones,” 1  that “[t]he first American patriot that 
shoots down one of these drones that comes too close to his children in his 
backyard will be an American hero.”2 
  
                                               
* Author Robert H. Gruber is a litigation associate at Greenberg Traurig, LLP.  This 
article is presented for informational purposes only, and it is not intended to be construed 
or used as general legal advice nor as a solicitation of any type.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance of Jordan Grotzinger, Adam Siegler, John Villasenor, and 
Ivan Perkins. 
 
1 Drones are also commonly referred to as “UAVs” or “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.”  See 
Matt McFarland, Here’s What Drone Advocates Love and Hate About the FAA’s 
Proposed Rules, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2015, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2015/02/15/heres-what-drone-
advocates-love-and-hate-about-the-faas-proposed-rules/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L2TD-JTTD (using “drone” “UAV” and “UAS” as interchangeable 
terms).  This article uses “drone,” “UAV,” and “UAS” more or less interchangeably, but 
with “UAS” referring to the entire system (including the operator), and “UAV” referring 
to the aircraft alone. 
 
2 Steve Watson, Judge Napolitano: First Patriot to Shoot Down a Government Spy Drone 
Will Be a Hero, INFOWARS.COM (May 16, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/judge-
napolitano-first-patriot-to-shoot-down-a-government-spy-drone-will-be-a-hero/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/RTP7-4MMM. 
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[2] If you sympathize with that sentiment, you are not alone.  Much of 
the discourse on domestic drone use has been informed by concerns over 
privacy implications.
3
  The judge’s statement epitomizes a kind of visceral 
reaction—one that many share—to the idea of unmanned aircraft 
monitoring our every activity.  In the broadest sense, this article invites 
readers to question that reaction.  Why would one fly a drone into an 
ordinary citizen’s backyard?  Wouldn’t safety regulations (and existing 
privacy laws) prohibit that behavior?  Should we really be shooting these 
things out of the sky? 
 
[3] Congress has instructed the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) to present a plan for integrating UAS into American airspace by 
September 2015.
4
  Right now, UAS are authorized for only a handful of 
uses, primarily public entities.
5
  Commercial UAS are prohibited,
6
 with 
few exceptions
7—although this is likely to change when the FAA’s most 
recent proposed rules go into effect.
8
 
 
                                               
3 See, e.g., Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones 
Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITTSBURGH J. TECH. 
L. & POL'Y 1, 22 (2013) (arguing that “proactive steps should be taken by both the 
Legislature and the Judiciary to ensure individual privacy rights are not eroded with the 
incorporation of [UAV] technology into our daily lives.”).   
 
4 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012). 
 
5 See John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and 
Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 471–73 (2013).  
 
6 Id. at 471. 
 
7 See, e.g., Nick Lavars, U.S. Gives Hollywood Film Studios Green Light on Drone Use, 
GIZMAG (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.gizmag.com/us-hollywood-exemption-film-drone-
use/33994/, archived at http://perma.cc/GEH3-TAVN. 
 
8 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (“NPRM”), 80 Fed. Reg. 9544,9590 (Feb. 23, 2015). 
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[4] At this stage, it is impossible to accurately predict the scope of the 
future UAS industry.  Its potential benefits are vast and varied: beyond 
mere job creation, drones will contribute to efficiency in various industries 
and aspects of society.  This is particularly true in the commercial sphere, 
where competition and innovation can drive progress towards functions 
far removed from the individual surveillance people fear.  UAS have 
already proven useful in functions from crop monitoring
9
 to gathering 
atmospheric data.
10
  Domino’s Pizza made headlines when it announced 
the development of delivery UAS systems, as have other companies—and 
while some skeptics dismissed the press releases as “publicity stunts,”11 it 
is not too difficult to imagine a future in which packages appear on our 
doorstep out of the sky.
12
  Recently, Facebook announced a plan that 
epitomizes the benevolent possibilities of commercial UAS.
13
  It has 
                                               
9 See Chris Anderson, Agricultural Drones, Relatively Cheap Drones with Advanced 
Sensors and Imaging Capabilities are Giving Farmers New Ways to Increase Yields and 
Reduce Crop Damage, 17 MIT TECH. REV. 3, 58, 60, (2014) available at 
www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/526491/agricultural-drones/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RA6G-FR8J. 
 
10 See Tereza Pultarova, Atmospheric Research Drones Developed by U.K. scientists, 
E&T (Aug. 2, 2013), http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2013/aug/atmoshperic-drones.cfm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AMW3-LTYX.  
 
11 See, e.g., David Hambling, Drone Deliveries: Beyond the Publicity Stunt, WIRED (Apr. 
6, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-04/06/drone-deliveries, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8ZZY-2WSW. 
 
12 See Jenny Stanton, Drone Delivery Is Here! China’s Largest Mail Firm to Deliver 
More Than 1,000 Packages A DAY to Remote Areas Using Fleet of Aircraft, DAILY MAIL 
(Mar. 24, 2015, 11:28 AM), www.dailymail.co.uk/news/peoplesdaily/article-
3009593/Drone-delivery-China-s-largest-mail-firm-deliver-1-000-packages-DAY-
remote-areas-using-fleet-aircraft.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4GU9-7PBZ. 
 
13 See Josh Constine, Facebook Will Deliver Internet Via Drones with “Connectivity 
Lab” Project Powered by Acqhires from Ascenta, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/27/facebook-drones/, archived at http://perma.cc/7N7S-
GEFJ; Victor Luckerson, Facebook Reportedly Wants to Buy a Drone Company, TIME 
(Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://time.com/12395/facebook-drones-titan-aerospace/, 
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purchased the U.K.-based company Ascenta, which manufactures solar-
powered aircraft that can stay aloft at high altitudes for years at a time.  
Facebook’s goal?  Providing Internet access in areas where traditional 
connections are impractical or impossible.
14
  Even though commercial 
UAS flight is still largely prohibited in the United States, the battle over 
drone regulation has already begun, fixated largely on imagined harms to 
people’s privacy.15  And the privacy advocates are winning: more than 
twenty states have passed laws restricting UAS operations.
16
  Many of 
these address law enforcement surveillance, but an increasing number of 
states are proposing—and enacting—restrictions on private and 
commercial aircraft.  For example, a bill proposed and enrolled in Texas 
makes it a misdemeanor to collect an image of a person’s land without 
consent.
17
  Other states are considering similar legislation.
18
  One town in 
                                                                                                                     
archived at http://perma.cc/HW6D-XSTM.   
 
14 See Luckerson, supra note 13.  In acquiring Ascenta, Facebook passed on Titan 
Aerospace, a similar startup that was later snapped up by Google for the same purpose: 
remote Internet service delivery.   
 
15 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 459–60, 487; see also Margot E. Kaminski, The Rules 
of the Sky, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:47 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_commercial_dr
one_rules_don_t_adequately_address_privacy_concerns.single.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3WMJ-SJZU (addressing the federal privacy issues and First Amendment 
concerns regarding state privacy regulations likely to arise in light of the FAA’s “less 
[than] stringent” proposed rules regulating small commercial drones).    
 
16 See Rich Williams, Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 29, 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/current-uas-state-law-landscape.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XQH5-8W6P. 
 
17 See Texas Privacy Act, H.B. No. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013). 
 
18 See Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU (Apr. 
22, 2014, 10:32 AM), available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states, archived at https://perma.cc/5ENY-
V8C5?type=source [hereinafter Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation] (providing a 
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Colorado must have gotten Napolitano’s memo—it considered issuing 
“drone hunting licenses” that would authorize its citizens to shoot any 
unpiloted aircraft.
19
 
 
[5] This sort of legislation is both premature and problematic, 
particularly with respect to the kind of drones that will be used for 
commercial or civil purposes (as opposed to law enforcement purposes).  
It is premature because legislators cannot foresee—and therefore cannot 
balance—all of the potential benefits and harms of commercial drone use.  
Many of the privacy interests purportedly advanced by restrictive 
legislation are already protected by other areas of the law.
20
  It is 
problematic because inconsistent and overly-restrictive regulations (1) 
potentially violate the First Amendment right to gather information and (2) 
threaten to chill industry growth.
21
  The harms such legislation causes are 
analogous, in a sense, to those that would have arisen if states had created 
a patchwork of Internet privacy laws several years before the development 
of the World Wide Web.
22
  Right now, the United States leads the pack in 
                                                                                                                     
status chart with each state proposal).  
 
19 See Nidhi Subbaraman, Open Season on Drones? Town Split over Licenses to Hunt 
Unmanned Aircraft, NBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.21alive.com/nbc33/news/Open-Season-On-Drones-Licenses-To-Hunt-
Unmanned-Aircraft-In-Colorado-218987751.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U6RP-
5VYZ. 
 
20 See, e.g., Villasenor, supra note 5, at 498–508. 
 
21 See Timothy M. Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the 
National Airspace, 85 N.D. L. REV. 597, 621 (2009) (“For the UAV industry to thrive, 
insurers, engineers, manufacturers, operators, military tacticians, and other stakeholders 
must have a firm and predictable set of laws that establish rights and liabilities emanating 
from UAV operations.”). 
 
22 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 517 (“If, in 1995, comprehensive legislation to protect 
Internet privacy had been enacted, it would have utterly failed to anticipate the 
complexities that arose after the turn of the century with the growth of social networking 
and location-based wireless services.  The Internet has proven useful and valuable in 
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UAS technology.  If the current legislative pattern continues, the U.S. 
might very well drive a market with incredible potential overseas, to more 
open-minded nations.
23
   
 
[6] Is restrictive legislation nevertheless justified, as a means of 
vindicating legitimate privacy interests?
24
  Perhaps not, particularly where 
commercial UAS use is concerned.  There are few cognizable 
circumstances in which using drones to monitor individual people will be 
profitable for non-government actors and entities.
25
  First, a primary 
advantage of unmanned aircraft is that they can go swiftly and easily 
where people cannot.  UAS could be used profitably to survey mines, 
monitor power lines in remote areas, collect traffic-flow information, 
                                                                                                                     
ways that were difficult to imagine over a decade and a half ago, and it has created 
privacy challenges that were equally difficult to imagine.  Legislative initiatives in the 
mid-1990s to heavily regulate the Internet in the name of privacy would likely have 
impeded its growth while also failing to address the more complex privacy issues that 
arose years later.”). 
 
23 See, e.g., Zenon Evans, Will the Government Test Drones in Your State?, REASON.COM 
(Dec. 31, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/31/will-the-government-test-
drones-in-your, archived at http://perma.cc/N85J-Z7VY (“Brendan Schulman, who 
works as special counsel for the drone industry, [said] ‘what we’ve experienced the past 
several years is a lot of regulatory delay. In the meantime, other countries have moved 
ahead with permitting and embracing commercial use.  Countries 
like Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom already have a framework for 
commercial use of drones.  That’s where you’ll see companies going to do the work.  
That’s where you see investment dollars going.’”). 
 
24 See generally Schlag, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that “proactive steps should be taken 
by both the Legislature and the Judiciary to ensure individual privacy rights are not 
eroded with the incorporation of [UAS] technology into our daily lives.”). 
 
25 Admittedly, drones could potentially be used to target celebrities.  But there are ways 
to prevent celebrities’ privacy from being invaded—California’s Anti-Paparazzi law is 
one such example—that do not also restrict drone operations.  To outlaw drone flights in 
the pursuit of protecting celebrities’ privacy would be a bit like outlawing smartphones to 
prevent people from hacking photographs. 
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spray and monitor crops, and so forth.  Some predict that eighty-percent of 
commercial drones will be used for agricultural purposes
26 —so the 
majority will seldom even accidentally interfere with individual privacy 
interests.  As one person put it, “corn doesn’t mind if you watch it.”27  
Second, even if a particular commercial drone’s images could be 
processed and linked to individuals’ identities, what would justify the cost 
of such directed monitoring?  Demographic information may be valuable, 
but our phones and Internet activity paint a cheaper and more accurate 
picture of consumer activities—where individuals go, where they shop, 
and what they buy.   
 
[7] The global market for UAS is growing fast.
28
 At the moment, the 
best available UAS technology belongs to the United States and Israel.
29
  
Developed for military purposes, this technology nevertheless has massive 
export potential for civil and commercial uses.   
 
                                               
26 See Christopher Doering, Growing Use of Drones Holds Promise of AG 
Transformation, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 30, 2014, 12:25 AM), 
http://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2014/03/29/growing-use-drones-poised-
transform-agriculture/7073585/, archived at http://perma.cc/TW2Y-G6MX. 
 
27 D.C. Denison, Maker Pro Newsletter - 10/17/13, MAKE: (Oct. 18, 2013, 4:45 PM), 
http://makezine.com/2013/10/18/maker-pro-newsletter-10-17-13/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FND7-EW48. 
 
28 See Benjamin Kapnik, Unmanned But Accelerating: Navigating the Regulatory and 
Privacy Challenges of Introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the National Airspace 
System, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 439, 440–41 (2012) (“Annual worldwide unmanned aircraft 
expenditures are expected to grow from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion within a decade.  
Although the market for civil use currently comprises less than 2% of the worldwide 
market for unmanned aircraft, that could change over the next several years as technology 
advances and as legislation and regulations allow broader use of unmanned aircraft in the 
NAS.”). 
 
29 See Tia Goldenberg, Israel Leads Global Drone Exports as Demand Grows, YAHOO 
NEWS (June 5, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/israel-leads-global-drone-exports-
demand-grows-194424173.html, archived at https://perma.cc/SN8N-435M?type=source. 
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[8] However, the United States’ monopoly on UAS technology may 
already be eroding.  In 2013 Israel surpassed the U.S. as the chief exporter 
of UAS technology—although Israel remains second to the U.S. in 
production.
30
  What accounts for this discrepancy?  A regulatory barrier: 
the companies that develop our military drones are restricted from 
marketing their technology elsewhere.
31
  China and other countries are 
now entering the ring.
32
  By competing in the global market, the U.S. can 
realize all the benefits of a multi-billion dollar industry once the FAA 
opens up the national airspace
33—which it is poised to begin doing soon—
but only if the U.S. avoids establishing a draconian regulatory framework 
for commercial UAS. 
 
[9] This Article focuses on commercial UAS, and on the legal 
frameworks—both current and potentially forthcoming—surrounding 
                                               
30 Id. 
 
31 See U.S. Drone Exporters Losing Out to Israeli, Chinese Competitors, HAMODIA, Feb. 
14, 2014, at 6, available at http://hamodia.com/2014/02/13/u-s-drone-exporters-losing-
israeli-chinese-competitors/, archived at http://perma.cc/94LW-5Z3A [hereinafter U.S. 
Drone Exporters] (“Exports of drones are tightly controlled by an agreement signed by 
members of a group called the Missile Technology Control Regime, which includes the 
United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.  The group has since 
expanded to 34 countries but Israel and China aren’t members. . . .  The controls give 
rival drone makers from countries such as Israel and China a chance to win more 
business in the growing global market for unmanned aerial vehicles, which one group 
projects to more than double in the next decade.  U.S. arms makers have been lobbying 
the government for several years to loosen the restrictions so they can sell their systems 
to more countries.”). 
 
32 U.S. Drone Exporters, supra note 31. 
 
33 Bill Wood, Wood on Plastics: Aerospace Market Losing Altitude, PLASTICS 
TECHNOLOGY (July 2010), http://www.ptonline.com/columns/wood-on-plastics-
aerospace-market-losing-altitude, archived at http://perma.cc/L2MB-DR3D. (“The U.S. 
currently holds a tremendous edge in UAV technology and production, but Europe and 
Asia are trying to catch up.  Many analysts believe that the commercial potential for 
UAV’s is nearly unlimited.  The only glitch is getting access to civilian airspace.”).  
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them.
34
  Part I provides a brief background of the politically-charged 
context within which UAS regulation is being developed.  Part II 
examines two critical issues in the UAS regulatory debate: (1) the extent 
to which the “third-party doctrine” will apply to information captured by 
commercial UAS; and (2) the boundaries of First Amendment protection 
of “information gathering.”  Part II also outlines existing state and federal 
laws governing civil drone use.  Part III examines approaches the United 
States could take in regulating commercial drone use.  Ultimately, the 
article concludes that the federalism model will stifle the market for UAS 
aircraft and technology, unless Congress acts to create a baseline federal 
scheme that assuages privacy concerns without hindering industry growth. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
[10] There is nothing novel about unmanned flight as a general concept.  
As John Villasenor has put it, “model airplane hobbyists have known for 
decades that an airplane can be flown without a human in the cockpit.”35  
Nor is there anything new using aircraft, model or otherwise, to take 
pictures: if someone visited a hobby store during the 1990’s, they might 
have seen toy rockets outfitted with cameras.  Light the fuse, watch the 
rocket fire upwards, and once it drifted down (with the aid of a parachute), 
one would be rewarded with a chip full of aerial views of the 
neighborhood.   
 
[11] The drones heard of today are simply an extension of this concept, 
the natural result of improvements in communications and imaging 
technology.
36
  Even weaponized drones are not themselves a recent idea.  
                                               
34 This Article uses “commercial,” “civil,” and “private” interchangeably to refer to what 
the FAA has designated as “civil” aircraft—essentially, any aircraft not operated by a 
public entity. 
 
35 Villasenor, supra note 5, at 458.  He’s right—I’ve been flying model airplanes for 
twenty years myself.   
 
36 Id. at 464. (“One key factor contributing to [UAV growth] is the continuing advance of 
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Unmanned aircraft were deployed in the Vietnam War; unsuccessful 
attempts date even farther back.
37
  Israel developed UAVs with real-time 
surveillance capabilities in the 1970s and 80s.
38
   
 
[12] However, UAS’s military proliferation after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 (and the ongoing firestorm of media coverage that 
resulted) cast the idea of “drones” in a decidedly negative light.39  As a 
result, the discussion over integrating UAS into domestic airspace has 
been dominated by skepticism.  Add in recent revelations about the extent 
of NSA surveillance and data collection—which grant legitimacy to 
growing concerns about the state of our privacy protections—and it is a 
very bad time to be a domestic drone.
40
  
 
[13] This is particularly unfortunate because the vast majority of 
domestic UAS applications, whether civil or private, are beneficial.  
                                                                                                                     
computing, imaging, and communications technologies.”).  
 
37 Id. at 464. 
 
38 Id.  
 
39 Even my own experiences demonstrated a change in attitude.  As a teenager I often 
traveled to compete in model airplane competitions, and it was eerie to watch people’s—
particularly TSA agents’—attitudes towards my models change from interest to 
skepticism.  Toys became “drones,” and by the end of my career it took a letter from the 
head pilot of United Airlines to get my model airplane overseas in one piece. 
 
40 See, e.g., Wendie Kellington, Unmanned Air Systems and Regulating Navigable 
Airspace, ALI ALBA LAND USE INST. 1 (Aug. 14–16 2013), available at 
http://www.wkellington.com/pdf/2013/Unmanned-Aerial-Systems-and-Regulating-
Navigable-Airspace.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G8FD-RLEY (“The military’s use of 
UAVs in the hunt for al Qaeda operatives created an indelible public image of mindless 
beasts carrying out a distant programmers’ messy bidding.  Moreover, reports of UAVs 
being developed for purposes like hiding from and sneaking up on people have not 
generated an enthusiastic reception for domestic use of the technology.  Civil demand for 
domestic UAVs thus finds itself colliding with a culture of wariness, creating difficult 
barriers to domestic UAV use and slowing regulatory response.”). 
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Indeed, if these aircraft are as successful at home as they have (arguably) 
been in their military applications, the market for new and varied models 
has incredible potential.  Unmanned flight can contribute to efficiency, 
productivity, and safety in a potentially unlimited number of areas.
41
  
Farmers can use them to crop-dust safely.
42
  Civil engineers can monitor 
traffic and power lines.  An enterprising farmer in Ireland, apparently, has 
discovered that drones are wonderful at herding sheep.
43
  In the coming 
decades, individuals may even receive pizzas and Internet service via 
drone.
44
   
 
[14] Nevertheless, integrating UAS into U.S. airspace raises a number 
of concerns.  The foremost of these relate to privacy and safety.  What 
follows is an overview of the frameworks that will govern the regulation 
of UAS, as well as an overview of existing regulations themselves. 
 
III.  SOURCES OF REGULATION 
 
 A.  Fourth Amendment: the Third-Party Doctrine 
   
1.  Precedent 
 
[15] The Fourth Amendment restricts government (not private actors), 
                                               
41 Id. (“According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), current domestic use 
of UAVs includes law enforcement, monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, 
weather research and scientific data collection by the federal government.”) 
 
42 As of the writing of this article, Japan has successfully implemented UAVs towards 
this purpose. 
 
43 See Michael Franco, Watch This Drone Shepherd Round Up Its Flock on an Irish 
Farm, CNET (Mar. 30, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/watch-this-drone-
shepherd-round-up-a-flock-on-a-farm-in-ireland/, archived at http://perma.cc/7YUF-
4RRU. 
 
44 See Hambling, supra note 11. 
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so some might question its place in an article about commercial drones.  
For this reason, and because others have discussed the subject in detail,
45
 
what follows is a primer on a particular piece of Fourth Amendment law—
the “third-party” or “Miller” doctrine.  The manner in which this doctrine 
is applied to data collected by UAS will bear significantly on developing 
policies regarding commercial drone use.  Articulated in United States v. 
Miller, this doctrine permits the government to obtain information from 
third parties, in certain circumstances, without the procedural hurdles that 
would otherwise present themselves if the information were sought 
directly from a suspect.
46
  
 
[16] In Miller, the trial court convicted the defendant of various federal 
offenses involving his operation of an unlicensed whiskey still.
47
  On 
appeal, he argued that the trial court committed error in failing to suppress 
records obtained from his two banks.
48
  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the conviction “on the ground that a depositor’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated when bank records . . . are obtained by 
means of a defective subpoena.”49  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
and reversed again.
50
 
 
[17] In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant 
retained an expectation of privacy in information relayed to the bank.
51
  
                                               
45 See generally Villasenor, supra note 5 (discussing government operation of unmanned 
aircraft and the Fourth Amendment). 
 
46 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
 
47 See id. at 437. 
 
48 See id. at 436. 
 
49 Id. at 437. 
 
50 Id. at 435. 
 
51 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
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Even though the bank was required by statute to maintain its records, and 
the defendant was required to release the information in order to do 
business with the bank, the Court cited prior holdings in concluding: 
 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him 
to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.
52
 
[18] The third-party doctrine has since formed the basis for a variety of 
notable Supreme Court opinions.  In Smith v. Maryland, police—without a 
warrant or court order—asked a telephone service provider to install a 
“pen register” in its offices in order to track a suspect’s phone calls.53  The 
Court held, in a decision that has wielded significant influence since the 
development of the Internet,
54
 that the defendant had “assumed the risk 
that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”55  The 
court noted that the register recorded only the numbers dialed—not the 
content of the conversations, which presumably would have been entitled 
to greater protection.
56
    
                                               
52 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 
53 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 
54 See John P. Collins, Project, The Third Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, N.Y.L. SCH. 
JUST. ACTION CTR. 6 (2012), available at http://www.nyls.edu/documents/justice-action-
center/student_capstone_journal/cap12collins.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CXA7-
HLFN (“The significance of this decision was not readily apparent, but by expanding the 
third party doctrine to include information revealed to a machine carrying out a routine 
task, the court laid a foundation that would drastically expand the reach of the third party 
doctrine upon the advent of the [I]nternet.”). 
 
55 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 
56 Id. at 741, 744. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 4 
 
14 
 
 
[19] Later, in California v. Greenwood, the Court extended its Smith 
analysis to rule that the contents of a suspect’s garbage received no Fourth 
Amendment protection.
57
  The Court reiterated its observation that “a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 58   Therefore, the Court held, 
procuring the suspect’s trash from his garbage collector worked no 
Constitutional harm.
59
  The Court also stressed, however, that the 
suspect’s transmission of information to the public in general deprived 
him of a Fourth Amendment claim: “Hence, ‘what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.’”60  The garbage bags in question were 
accessible not only to the trash collector, but to “animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”61 
 
[20] The final Supreme Court case that deserves mention is United 
States v. Jones.
62
  In Jones, the government procured a warrant to place a 
GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle; the warrant provided that the device 
should be secured within ten days in the District of Columbia.
63
  Instead, 
the device was attached to the suspect’s vehicle in Maryland and on the 
                                               
57 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
 
58 Id. at 41. 
 
59 Id. at 40 (“respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of 
conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through 
respondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”). 
 
60 Id. at 41 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).  
 
61 Id. at 40. 
 
62 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).   
  
63 Id. at 948. 
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eleventh day, voiding the warrant.
64
  The government monitored the 
vehicle’s position for twenty-eight days, and at one point changed the 
battery in the device—also in Maryland.65  The Court unanimously held 
that the month-long monitoring of the vehicle’s position, without a proper 
warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.
66
   
 
[21] In Jones, the Court neither relied on nor repudiated the “third-
party” doctrine.67  The case nevertheless merits note because of the varied 
perspectives articulated in not only the Court’s opinion, but also in certain 
Justices’ concurrences.68  Scalia wrote for the majority.69   His opinion 
highlighted the trespass that had occurred when law enforcement placed 
the GPS device on the suspect’s automobile.70  It noted a turn in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that had occurred in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, beginning with Katz (the source of a test that has 
dominated more recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test). 71   Before that, the Court stated, Fourth 
Amendment rights had turned on the more traditional law of trespass.
72
  
 
[22] In an originalist interpretation typical of Scalia’s Constitutional 
                                               
64 Id. 
 
65 Id.  
 
66
 Id. at 954–57. 
 
67 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
 
68 See id. at 948–64. 
 
69 Id. at 948. 
 
70 Id. at 949. 
 
71 Id. at 949–50. 
 
72 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50. 
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readings, the Court held that Katz’s “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy” 
test was not exclusive; rather, it complemented this more traditional, 
trespassed-based line of Fourth Amendment law.
73
  The Court’s decision 
rested on the fact that the government had “physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”74  Such an intrusion, 
the Court reasoned, would “no doubt . . . have been considered a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”75  
The Court rejected the government’s principle argument (tied to Katz and 
its progeny): that Jones held no reasonable expectation of privacy in (1) 
the undercarriage of his car or (2) his movements on public roads.
76
  It 
distinguished prior cases involving mere observation, with no 
accompanying trespass.  Despite its reliance on the government’s trespass 
as the basis for its holding—and its distinguishing of similar cases without 
that element—the majority did not address whether the extended 
monitoring achieved here would have violated the Fourth Amendment if 
no trespass had occurred.  In fact, it explicitly avoided that question: “[i]t 
may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without 
an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but 
the present case does not require us to answer that question.”77 
 
[23] Jones also generated two concurring opinions.  Justice Alito, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, would have held that 
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights to privacy were violated based solely on 
Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.78  They concluded four 
                                               
73 Id. at 952.  
 
74 Id. at 949. 
 
75 Id. 
 
76 Id. at 950–52. 
 
77 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
 
78 Id. at 957–64. 
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weeks of location monitoring contradicted reasonable expectations: 
 
The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of 
GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of 
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have 
anticipated.  Under this approach, relatively short-term 
monitoring of a person's movements on public streets 
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.  But the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.
79
 
[24] Justice Sotomayor joined the majority in agreeing that a trespass-
based approach functions as a baseline of constitutional protection, but she 
wrote separately to address her own concerns with electronic monitoring.
80
  
She agreed with Alito’s concurrence insofar as, under the Katz analysis, 
the government’s long-term monitoring of Jones violated his expectation 
of privacy.
81
  She went further in suggesting that even certain types of 
short-term electronic monitoring might violate the Fourth Amendment.
82
  
Finally, she questioned the continuing validity of the third-party doctrine 
in the digital age: 
 
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
                                               
79 Id. at 963–64 (internal citations omitted). 
 
80 Id. at 954–57. 
 
81 Id. at 955–56. 
 
82 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56. 
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to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. 
. . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily 
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.
83
 
  2.  Application of Third-party Doctrine to Information  
  Captured by Commercial Drones 
[25] What can the foregoing cases teach us about information captured 
by commercial drones?  First, these aircraft—and the data they capture—
will not fall neatly into any particular line of Supreme Court precedent.  
Miller’s original formula highlighted the “voluntary” nature of the 
defendant’s disclosures to the bank, which were made for the purpose of 
receiving services.
84
  This relationship is not likely to exist in cases where 
commercial UAS capture images of private citizens.  Perhaps a “Facebook 
drone” that provides Internet may keep records of Internet activity, but any 
images it captures would be unrelated to the service provided.
85
  
Relatedly, in Smith, the Court was concerned not just with voluntary 
disclosure to a third party, but also with the non-personal nature of the call 
data.
86
  UAS are distinguishable on this basis as well. 
 
[26] However, Greenwood identifies another factor in the Court’s Katz 
analyses: whether the information in question was divulged to the public 
                                               
83 Id. at 957 (internal citations omitted). 
 
84 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
  
85 See generally Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Lays Out Its Roadmap For Creating Internet-
Connected Drones, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2014, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/09/facebook-drones-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/C6LX-
LJNN (explaining Facebook’s plan for bringing Internet access to the world through 
drones). 
 
86 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979). 
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at large.
87
  To be fair, that case also cited a “voluntary” disclosure of 
information to a third party—the trash collector—in expectation of 
services provided.
88
  But it is not at all clear that the result rested on this 
relationship.  The Court appeared just as concerned with the fact that the 
suspect’s garbage was accessible to curious members of the public. 89  
While commercial or private drones could conceivably be used to retrieve 
information a citizen sought to protect as secret—for instance, by 
monitoring electronic transmissions—it seems people are far more 
concerned with the images they might capture.  In this, Greenwood is of 
little help and would suggest that any images taken of an individual on 
public roads would be subject to appropriation by law enforcement.
90
   
 
[27] Finally, Jones suggests the Court is beginning to consider 
rethinking the third party doctrine in the context of the digital age.  
Sotomayor’s concurrence explicitly states this,91 and five of the justices 
would likely have found a Fourth Amendment violation based solely on 
Katz’s “reasonable expectations” test.92  The Court’s narrow basis for its 
holding, however, kept the third-party doctrine alive for the time being.  
 
[28] Jones may indeed suggest that the Supreme Court is open to 
breathing new life into the Fourth Amendment as technology continues to 
permit cheaper, more pervasive surveillance.
93
  And in the context of 
digital information, at least one current Justice may be open to rethinking 
                                               
87 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
 
88 Id. 
 
89 Id. 
 
90 See id. 
 
91 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
 
92 Id. at 954–64. 
 
93 Id. at 962–63. 
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(or eliminating) the third-party doctrine.
94
  Nevertheless, at the moment, it 
appears that images legally collected by UAS would often be available for 
government access—at least so long as the contents of those images 
conveyed information revealed to the public.
95
  
 
[29] If that is the case, one can reasonably expect that the third-party 
doctrine will influence regulatory approaches to commercial UAS at the 
state and local level.  For example: the ACLU (a staunch proponent of, 
and lobbyist for, UAS regulation) is currently concerned largely with 
restricting government surveillance.
96
  However, that may change—once 
private UAS assimilate into our airspace
97—if law enforcement begins 
using the third-party doctrine as a loophole to retrieve data without 
probable cause or a warrant.
98
  Granted, it may not be legal or profitable 
                                               
94 Id. at 957. 
 
95 See generally Carol Cratty, FBI Uses Drones for Surveillance in U.S., CNN (June 20, 
2013, 7:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/19/politics/fbi-drones/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5J4T-99FF (stating that the FBI’s policy on retaining images from drones 
is unclear). 
 
96 See, e.g., Neema Singh Guliani, Unchecked Government Drones? Not over My 
Backyard, ACLU (Mar. 24, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-
freely/unchecked-government-drones-not-over-my-backyard?redirect=blog/technology-
and-liberty/unchecked-government-drones-not-over-my-backyard, archived at 
https://perma.cc/K698-AHKW?type=source. 
 
97 Because public entities dominate the domestic UAS scene for the moment, it is 
possible that the ACLU is simply focused on the more immediate issue.  See id. 
 
98 At least one writer on the ACLU website has made this connection in the context of 
law enforcement use, condemning a North Dakota bill that would permit the use of 
evidence incidentally collected during an authorized government drone flight.  See Allie 
Bohm, Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2013, 
3:15 PM) https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/drone-legislation-whats-being-proposed-
states, archived at https://perma.cc/UQ5X-XPMT?type=source [hereinafter Drone 
Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States] (“[T]here are also bills that take the 
low road: North Dakota’s bill explicitly allows incidentally collected information to be 
introduced in court.  So, if a drone on the way to fight a forest fire happens to record you 
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for a private entity to track a particular subject’s every move.  On the other 
hand, one can easily imagine that a private drone collecting images in an 
urban setting will happen to snap a photograph of a crime in progress.  
Under many states’ existing schemes for UAS regulation, the government 
would be required to ignore or destroy such an image if it originated from 
a government drone—but not if it originated from a privately-operated 
drone.
99
  Privacy advocates that have so rigorously promoted a higher 
standard for government surveillance will certainly want to eliminate this 
discrepancy.  
  
B.  The First Amendment 
 
[30] The Fourth Amendment will not be the Constitution’s only 
contribution to the debate over commercial UAS.  Courts have read into 
the First Amendment a right—held not just by the press, but by private 
citizens—to information gathering.100  Because the Supreme Court has yet 
to rule on the matter, however, the extent of behavior the First 
Amendment might protect is not entirely clear. 
 
[31] The most recent cases discussing this “right to record” have 
centered largely on private citizens’ recording of police activity.101  This is 
                                                                                                                     
engaged in private activities, the police would not be required to delete that information 
and could actually use it in court against you, no warrant required—before or after the 
fact.  This could create some dangerous incentives.”). 
 
99 See generally Rich Williams, 2014 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2014-state-unmanned-aircraft-
systems-uas-legislation.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/ZL7X-QHV8?type=source 
(summarizing the current state legislation regarding UAS). 
 
100 See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of 
Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 
101 See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 83; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 
155, 156 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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not surprising; police secrecy and police misconduct stir negative 
reactions from unease to revulsion.  Moreover, the benefits of greater 
transparency in this area—such as protecting citizens from abuse, and 
holding police responsible for abusing their positions of power
102—would 
seem to far outweigh any detriments.
103
  Accordingly, several Circuit 
Courts of Appeal have held that private citizens have a First Amendment 
right to record law enforcement activities.
104
   
 
[32] One of the more recent of these decisions is Glik v. Cunniffe.
105
  In 
that case, plaintiff Simon Glik brought a § 1983 claim alleging that his 
First Amendment rights had been violated by his arresting officers.
106
 
Glik—happening on an arrest in progress—had begun filming the event 
when it appeared that the police were harming the arrestee and was 
subsequently arrested for violation of a wiretap statute.
107
  The First 
Circuit held in Glik’s favor, citing a slew of authority establishing his right 
to record the officers’ actions.108  Notably, the court also held that the right 
                                               
102 In addition, the recordings themselves are competent evidence for trial.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 1001, 1002.  
 
103 See, e.g., Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The Case for A 
First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 349, 355 (2012) (“As a 
leading reason for their opposition to citizen-surveillance, police advocates have cited the 
concern that officers will hesitate in life-threatening situations for fear of their actions 
being caught on video.  However, the more prevalent concern for police officers is the 
risk video monitoring poses to the substantial deference courts give officers in their 
official recounting of facts.”). 
 
104 See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 83; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. 
 
105 Glik, 655 F.3d at 83. 
 
106 Id. at 79. 
 
107 Id. at 79–80. 
 
108 Id. at 82–89. 
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was firmly established within its jurisdiction—as required by § 1983.109  
Finally, it established in clear language that the First Amendment protects 
not only the press’s right to record, but that of individuals, as well.  The 
court focused in particular on the location of the recording, noting that 
“Glik filmed the defendant police officers in the Boston Common, the 
oldest city park in the United States and the apotheosis of a public forum. 
In such traditional public spaces, the rights of the state to limit the exercise 
of First Amendment activity are ‘sharply circumscribed.’”110 
[33] The Glik court clarified that the right to record, like any First 
Amendment activity, is “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.”111  Although it declined to explore these further, its holding 
is instructive in that it relies on Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n for the proposition that states’ ability to limit recording 
is “sharply circumscribed” in public.112  Perry, a 1983 Supreme Court 
case, involved not recording but traditional speech activities.
113
   
 
[34] Other circuits are consistent with Glik in recognizing a right to 
record police officers in public.
114
  Although the Glik court mentioned two 
somewhat contrary decisions in the Third and Fourth circuits, these rested 
on the “clearly established” portion of the § 1983 analysis, not on whether 
                                               
109 Id. at 88. 
 
110 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).   
 
111 Id. at 84. 
 
112 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.   
 
113 Id. at 38–40. 
 
114 See, e.g., Bowens v. Superintendant of Miami South Beach Police Dep’t., 557 Fed. 
Appx. 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2014); Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 
155, 156 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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the constitutional right existed per se.
115
  Moreover, Kelly v. Borough of 
Carlisle dealt with recording during a traffic stop—a situation the court 
distinguished as inherently dangerous.
116
   
 
[35] Thus, most or all courts are in agreement in acknowledging the 
right to record police in public.  Courts in most Circuits also agree that the 
right to record extends to matters of public concern.
117
  However, there has 
been less agreement (and less guidance in general) on other circumstances 
in which the right to record will apply.
118
   
                                               
115 Glik, 655 F.3d at 85. 
 
116 Id.  Further, in 2014, the First Circuit clarified that the right to record in a traffic stop, 
while not unqualified, is now “clearly established.”  Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 9 (1st 
Cir. 2014). 
 
117 See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather 
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to 
record matters of public interest.”); see also Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. Civ. A. 94-10531-
PBS, 1997 WL 258494 at *6 (D. Mass, Mar. 26, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (finding 
that an independent reporter has a protected right under the First Amendment and state 
law to videotape public meetings); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 
1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); 
Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs’ interest 
in filming public meetings is protected by the First Amendment); Williamson, 65 F.3d at 
159 (11th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a law 
enforcement officer who seized the film of and arrested a participant in a demonstration 
for photographing undercover officers); Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 
1070–72 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (finding that city council’s ban on member's attempt to record 
proceedings regulated conduct protected by the First Amendment); Lambert v. Polk 
County, 723 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (“[I]t is not just news organizations . . . 
who have First Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events....”); United 
States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that the press generally 
has no right to information superior to that of the general public) (citing Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978)). 
 
118 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4. CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 63–64 (2013) (questioning whether the First 
Amendment right will apply with drone photography). 
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[36] How, then, will courts analyze the First Amendment rights of UAV 
operators?  Glik appears to indicate that some existing precedent on “time, 
place, and manner” restrictions will enter into the analysis: the right to 
speak is at its strongest in public places, and so is the right to record.
119
  
However, other First Amendment principles are less susceptible to such a 
simple analogy.  For example, an early step in First Amendment analyses 
is to determine the type of speech.  This question is difficult to answer in 
the UAV context—taking a picture is taking a picture.120  Similarly, true 
speech can be regulated in areas in which there probably remains a 
constitutional protection for information gathering.  The Supreme Court 
has held it constitutionally permissible to restrict speech at airports,
121
 but 
it would make little sense to prohibit photography in a place (1) with 
significant law enforcement presence, and (2) in which patrons have very 
little expectation of privacy.  Precedent will not always be as useful as the 
court in Glik found it to be.  Therefore, there is yet little guidance on what 
types of time, place, and manner restrictions will be constitutional in the 
UAV context. 
 
[37] Ultimately, the extent of constitutional protections for UAV 
operators will boil down to a weighing of privacy against expression.
122
  
Seth Kreimer has identified one relevant principle of First Amendment 
law that might guide such an analysis: 
 
                                               
119 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
 
120 One might examine the purposes of collecting an image: are they artistic?  
Journalistic?  Scientific?  That approach could work in limited circumstances—for 
example, vulgar purposes could constitutionally be proscribed. 
 
121 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Cal., Inc. v. City of L.A., 48 Cal. 4th 
446, 460 (2010). 
 
122 See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 392–93 (2011). 
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[R]egulation must follow established legal rules that 
authoritatively recognize the scope of the privacy interest at 
stake and tailor the response to meet concerns of 
constitutional magnitude. Catchall statutes . . . do not meet 
this requirement.  Nor do claims of street-level bureaucrats 
who maintain a right to discharge their duties in public 
without being recorded, nor those of private parties who 
seek to remove from the public domain images they have 
revealed to the public gaze. . . . 
 
Once we recognize that image capture is protected by 
principles of free expression, proposals to impose liability 
without observing the established limitations of privacy 
torts—either by common law innovation or by statute—
raise serious constitutional questions.
123
 
 
If Kreimer’s observations are correct, lawmakers passing “drone” 
legislation may be faced with an ironic result: their laws may violate the 
First Amendment unless they more or less align with the existing legal 
systems they deemed inadequate.
124
  Laws that restrict UAS capturing 
images of private property, for example, could fail (1) because of 
overbreadth and (2) because they fail to conform to established 
expectations of privacy. 
 
[38] One more facet of First Amendment doctrine that deserves note is 
a preference for narrow holdings that will probably apply in circumstances 
involving UAS.  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
approach: “[w]e continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of 
the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and 
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more 
                                               
123 Id. at 393, 398. 
 
124 Id. at 389–91. 
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broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”125 
 
[39] This preference could have a particularly deleterious effect on a 
burgeoning UAS industry.  State laws that broadly violate the First 
Amendment, rather than being tested on their faces in the courts, could 
instead survive for years (with minor erosions).  In the meantime, 
commercial drone users will surely avoid investing in “illegal” activities 
that may or may not be constitutionally protected—and insurers will avoid 
insuring them. 
 
[40] It may seem odd to some that the right to take a picture would be 
protected by the First Amendment—after all, it is conduct with little 
content.  But there are strong arguments for such a protection.  People 
often take pictures in anticipation of disseminating them later.
126
  And 
even if that is not the photographer’s intention, she should not be deemed 
universally unworthy of First Amendment protections.  The Court has 
stated free speech includes the freedom not to speak at all, and even 
“communications of one” inform later acts of speech.127   
 
[41] UAS will be used to exercise freedom of speech in numerous—and 
worthwhile—ways.  One obvious example is by the media: drones will 
soon be capable of performing every function a news helicopter can, and 
                                               
125 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524, 532–33 (1989)). 
 
126 Kreimer, supra note 122, at 381 (“One might try to dissect the medium into its 
component acts of image acquisition, recording, and dissemination and conclude that 
recording is an unprotected ‘act’ without an audience.  But this maneuver is as 
inappropriate as maintaining that the purchase of stationery or the application of ink to 
paper are ‘acts’ and therefore outside of the aegis of the First Amendment.”). 
 
127 Id. at 378–79 (“Diaries of words or images need not communicate with outsiders to 
merit constitutional protection under the First Amendment. . . .  Speech is protected not 
simply as a way of communicating with others, but as a means of defining the speaker's 
thoughts, intellect, and memories.”). 
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more.  But there will be other UAS uses tied highly to freedoms of 
expression, including some that we may not anticipate.  One example is 
“drone art”—artwork created from images taken by UAVs.128  NBC News 
sponsored the first “New York City Drone Film Festival” in March of this 
year.
129
  People from landscape artists to Hollywood film producers will 
want to incorporate these aircraft in their media of expression.  
 
[42] In the meantime, states’ drone policies have already begun to 
violate First Amendment rights.  The Texas Privacy Act may, in fact, have 
been designed to do just that: the law was proposed after a drone hobbyist 
discovered a slaughterhouse polluting a river with pig’s blood.130  In this 
sense, the Act (and others like it) could be construed as an effort to protect 
businesses’ privacy from individuals under the guise of doing the reverse.  
Although the law may be struck down if challenged and although it creates 
exemptions for certain test sites,
131
 Texas has proven that states may not 
be the most conscientious laboratories for developing drone legislation. 
  
 
                                               
128 The Art of Drone Painting, Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College (Dec. 6, 
2014), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/art-of-drone-painting/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XS8S-A3FG. 
 
129 Organized for the first time in 2014, the festival was started by an enthusiast “with a 
desire to change the perceptions of drones.”  New York City Drone Film Festival, NBC 
NEWS, http://nycdronefilmfestival.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ7L-PWKX (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2015); New York Drone Film Festival Is Meant to ‘Fight Stigma,’ 
Creator Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nyc-drone-film-festival/nyc-drone-film-festival-
n318121, archived at http://perma.cc/DST3-BPRY. 
 
130 Laura Patty, The Sky Is the Limit: Regulating The Next Generation of Privacy 
Invasion, GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. (2013), available at 
http://ggulawreview.org/2013/11/29/the-sky-is-the-limit-regulating-the-next-generation-
of-privacy-invasion-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/JG26-HSBV (“Don’t mess with the 
meatpacking lobby in Texas.”). 
 
131 Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.002 (2013). 
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C.  Existing Privacy Protections 
 
[43] Of course, a large number of existing state laws will also apply to 
the domestic use of drones.  Flying UAVs at a low and/or unsafe altitude 
over private property could violate trespass laws.
132
  Use a drone for 
snooping, and you could face liability under intrusion upon seclusion, 
stalking, harassment, or nuisance theories.
133
  Distribute the images you 
obtained, and the list of laws you may have broken grows to include 
“public disclosure of private facts.” 134   Intercepting data or 
communications could conceivably violate wiretap statutes.
135
  Some 
privacy frameworks may require rewording to explicitly cover UAS; 
others will suffice as written.
136
  
 
[44] Scholars have written in detail about the interaction between 
existing laws and UAS activity; for example, John Villasenor has 
published an article including an extensive and unbiased survey.
137
  
However, the existing framework of privacy protections will have little 
impact on the advent of commercial UAVs.  UAVs used for benign 
information gathering will represent the vast majority of the commercial 
market,
138
 and will not run afoul of existing privacy laws—provided that 
they remain within their permitted airspace.  This Article therefore 
                                               
132 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 499. 
 
133 Id. at 500–01. 
 
134 Id. 
 
135 Id. at 498. 
 
136 See id. at 499–500 (Arizona trespass statute likely applies to UAVs, whereas Oregon’s 
and California’s may not). 
 
137 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 498–508.  Readers who are interested in this topic are 
encouraged to consult John Villasenor’s work. 
 
138 See Doering, supra note 26. 
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foregoes further coverage of the subject.  
 
D.  Proposed and Enacted “Drone Laws” at the State and 
Local Level 
 
[45] In 2013, forty-three states proposed bills specifically regulating 
UAVs.
139
  In 2014, that number grew and many of the bills were 
enacted.
140
  As of the writing of this article, legislation has been passed in 
more than twenty of those states.
141
 
 
[46] Most states’ primary concern has been regulating law enforcement 
use of UAVs.  Accordingly, most of the proposed bills in 2013—for 
example—would require a warrant for law enforcement to use a drone for 
surveillance of a suspect, subject to certain exceptions, including 
emergency situations.
142
  A number of different approaches have 
emerged—for instance, legislation passed in Georgia permits surveillance 
only to investigate felonies, not misdemeanors.
143
  Virginia has passed a 
two-year moratorium on all law enforcement use of UAVs.
144
  A Nebraska 
bill prohibits law enforcement use—with or without a warrant—except in 
terrorism investigations.
145
 
                                               
139 See Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 18. 
 
140 See 2014 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGIS. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2014-
state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-legislation.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6KEE-
7T3F. 
 
141 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 16.  
 
142 See Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, supra note 98 
(surveying 2013 drone legislation). 
 
143 S.B. 200, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). 
 
144 H.B. 2012, 2013 Sess. (Va. 2013). 
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[47] However, a number of states have already begun to consider 
private and commercial restrictions.  A proposed bill in Missouri would 
ban using a drone to conduct video surveillance on any individual, or over 
private property, without consent.
146
  In Washington, the House passed 
Bill 2178, which similarly prohibits persons from flying UAVs over 
private property without consent;
147
 the Bill stalled in the Senate, but 
several of its policies were incorporated into another bill that was 
passed.
148
  Wisconsin has approved a bill that would make it a 
misdemeanor to photograph, record, or otherwise observe an individual in 
any location in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
149
  A recent California bill would make it a trespass to fly a drone, 
without consent, over private property and “below the navigable 
airspace.”150  The Texas Privacy Act creates two separate misdemeanors: 
(1) non-consensual UAV imaging of private property, and (2) possessing 
or distributing an image so obtained.
151
  And these are only some 
examples of legislation targeted at private or commercial UAS. 
 
[48] Localities have also begun to restrict UAV flight, with much more 
                                                                                                                     
145 L.B. 412, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013). 
 
146 H.B. 46, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012). 
 
147 H.B. 2178, 63d Leg., 2014 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). 
 
148 Ashley Stewart, Bill Limiting Drone Use Passes House, Senate, THE SEATTLE TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2014, 4:54 PM), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2014/03/10/bill-limiting-drone-use-
passes-house-sentate/, archived at http://perma.cc/B95J-7MQ2. 
 
149 S.B. 196, 2013-2014 Leg. (Wis. 2013). 
 
150 S.B. 142, 2014-2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015).   
 
151 See 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691–94.  In addition, the Act’s definition of “image” 
includes sound and other forms of data.  See id. at 3691. 
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peculiar results.  Both St. Bonaficius, Minnesota and Evanston, Illinois 
have banned UAV flight within city limits.
152
  Evanston’s resolution 
exempts hobbyists from the ban, but St. Bonaficius’s does not.153   Of 
course, the most alarming solution proposed at the local level arises in 
Deer Trail, Colorado—the town that considered issuing “drone hunting” 
licenses.
154
 
 
[49] So far, attempts to address commercial UAS at the state and local 
level have probably overreached at times.  First, some likely run afoul of 
the First Amendment.  Even if that is not the case, they fail to reflect a 
reasonable balance between privacy protections and the economic and 
social benefits of UAS.   
 
[50] All the above examples have the potential, in their overreaching, to 
restrict the growth of the UAS industry, for several reasons.  The first is 
simply that outlawing a technology, by definition, eliminates buyers from 
its market.  But there’s more to it.  UAVs, by nature, will roam.  They may 
pass through the airspace over multiple cities, or even multiple states.  
They may retrieve images of other jurisdictions without actually crossing 
overhead.
155
  Operators will have to be aware of every law they might 
bump against; if those laws are unclear or too varied, they will be unable 
to calculate potential liability, and far less likely to invest in purchasing a 
drone.
156
 
                                               
152 See David Swanson, All Drone Politics Is Local, WAR IS A CRIME .ORG (Nov. 14, 
2013), http://warisacrime.org/content/all-drone-politics-local, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FEW4-E8CY. 
 
153 See id. 
 
154 See Ryan Grenoble, Done Hunting in Deer Trail, Colorado? Town Considers Bounty 
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 17, 2013, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/drone-hunting-deer-trail-
colorado_n_3611806.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZE2-P4WP.  
 
155 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 515. 
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[51] Operators will also want insurance from legal liability for their 
UAV operations.  This could wind up being very expensive, and not just 
because uncertainty in the law will raise costs.  Insurers are nothing if not 
cognizant of risk.  The potential liability exposure of operating a UAV in 
some of the jurisdictions listed above would be massive.  A commercial 
drone hovering in a single location could conceivably capture images of 
hundreds of individuals’ private property.  Neither an operator nor an 
insurer would want to take that risk in, say, Texas or Wisconsin.   
  
E.  Federal Sources of Regulation—The FAA 
 
[52] The Federal Aviation Administration, or “FAA,” is an arm of the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”).157  Its primary mission is aviation 
safety.
158
  The current organization has its origins in a 1958 act of 
                                                                                                                     
156 For one person’s anecdote on how regulations disappoint potential customers and 
spoil UAS deals, see Mike Francis, Drone Company Says Ambiguity in Federal 
Regulations Keeps Customers on Sidelines, OREGONLIVE (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2014/04/drone_company_says_ambiguity
_i.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3EFG-FQPQ (“Stephen Burtt, the cofounder and 
CEO of Aerial Technology International, says his Clackamas-based company has 
answered many inquiries about its unmanned aerial systems—drones—from potential 
corporate customers. . . .  [T]he conversations have been promising, with customers 
seeing the value of buying one of the company's drones to carry out tasks that currently 
require pilots or other workers.  But then the corporate legal department gets involved.  
And the potential sale stalls.  ‘There's an incredible level of frustration’ about the state of 
federal regulation of unmanned vehicles, he said.  The slow rollout of regulations in this 
country means ‘the rest of the world has much more developed markets’ for the use of 
drones.”). 
 
157 See Our Administrations, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/administrations, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DD5W-Z5DF (last updated Mar. 10, 2015). 
 
158 See Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B6DZ-KBPD (last modified Apr. 23, 2010, 9:37:40 AM) (“Our 
continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the 
world.”). 
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Congress creating a “Federal Aviation Agency”; the name change 
occurred in 1966, when the agency was incorporated into a newly-formed 
DOT.
159
 
 
[53] The FAA’s earliest predecessor entity was the Aeronautics Branch 
of the Department of Commerce, which was formed with the passing of 
the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
160
  Before that time, the aviation industry 
had been stunted by the uncertainty of myriad state statutory and common 
law approaches.
161
  Congress based its authority for regulating aviation on 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
162
 
 
[54] Those problems were remedied, and manned aircraft now enjoy a 
set of regulations, promulgated by the FAA, that is uniform throughout the 
United States. Consistent with its mission of fostering safety in the 
national airspace, the FAA promulgates generally-applicable rules 
regarding the design, maintenance, and operation of aircraft.
163
  Because 
these rules were created with manned flight in mind, however, many of 
them do not or cannot apply to unmanned aircraft.
164
  UAS have thrown a 
                                               
159 See History, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XR3W-WGL8 (last modified Feb. 19, 2015, 4:23:26 PM). 
 
160 See id. 
 
161 See id. 
 
162 See Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones in the National Airspace, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 489, 
518 (2012). 
 
163 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF 
CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A STRATEGY FOR THE FAA’S AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICE 12 
(National Academy Press 1998). 
 
164 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 
9544, 9549 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 
91, 101, 107, 183). 
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wrench in the FAA’s regulatory scheme—for example, lacking a cockpit, 
they cannot conform with the mechanical standards for cockpit doors. 
 
[55] The FAA also classifies airspace according to a number of factors, 
including altitude ranges and proximity to airports.
165
  Aircraft are subject 
to varying requirements depending on the airspace classes in which they 
operate.
166
    
 
[56] The FAA has provided some guidance with respect to UAV 
operations.  Direct line-of-sight to the aircraft is required at all times.
167
  
Drones may only be operated with a Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization (hereinafter “COA”) from the FAA, or through a Special 
Airworthiness Certificate-Experimental Category (hereinafter “SAC-
EC”).168   COAs have been available for a number of years to public 
entities—such as law enforcement—that wish to operate a drone.169  Only 
                                               
165 See Takahashi, supra note 162, at 507–09.  
 
166 See id. at 507.  
 
167 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 472–73 (“Under the new law, public UAS operators 
have had access to expedited COAs since May 14, 2012. UAS under these authorizations 
must weigh no more than twenty-five pounds and be operated within the line of sight of 
the operator, less than 400 feet above the ground, and during daylight conditions.”). 
 
168 See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN, https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq/, archived at https://perma.cc/89JY-WUFC (last 
modified Mar. 17, 2015, 11:02:52 AM). 
 
169 See Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN (Jan. 6, 
2014), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153, archived 
at https://perma.cc/VAA8-WBK2.  For more detail on the process by which public 
entities receive authorization to operate UAVs, and on authorizations that have been 
granted, see Benjamin Kapnik, Unmanned but Accelerating: Navigating the Regulatory 
and Privacy Challenges of Introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the National Airspace 
System, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 439, 445–46 (2012) (“To qualify for a certificate, the 
applicant must show the aircraft's response to losing communication with its operator, 
protocol if communication cannot be recovered, and that the unmanned aircraft can be 
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recently, though, did the FAA offer a blanket COA to private operators for 
which it had granted an “exemption.”  Before that, non-government UAS 
were authorized for experimental purposes only through the SAC-EC 
process.
170
  The FAA has been sparing in granting exemptions to private 
or commercial operators.
171
  As of April 21, 2015, it had granted only 
                                                                                                                     
contained within a proposed flight area.  The applicant must provide documentation of: 
(1) the proposed operating area; (2) the manuals and checklists associated with the 
aircraft, including those for normal and emergency procedures; (3) training for relevant 
personnel; (4) evidence of completion of pilot licenses or other necessary certification; 
and (5) proof that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has approved the 
frequency of spectrum used to communicate with the aircraft.  The typical COA is valid 
for two years.  Although the FAA initially refused to divulge information about the COA 
applications and awards, in response to a lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
the agency released a list of sixty-one entities that had sought licenses to operate 
unmanned aircraft in April 2012.  Of those entities, only four applicants were 
disapproved, and forty-one of the licenses remained active.  Entities with active licenses 
include universities, federal agencies, local police departments, and branches of the 
military.”). 
 
170 See Unmanned Aircraft (UAS) Certifications and Authorizations, FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN, http://www.faa.gov/uas/certifications_authorizations/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AW5R-37KG (last modified Dec. 27, 2013, 4:03:43 PM) (“For civil 
operation, applicants may obtain a Special Airworthiness Certificate, Experimental 
Category by demonstrating that their unmanned aircraft system can operate safely within 
an assigned flight test area and cause no harm to the public.  Applicants must be able to 
describe how their system is designed, constructed and manufactured; including 
engineering processes, software development and control, configuration management, 
and quality assurance procedures used, along with how and where they intend to fly.  If 
the FAA determines the project does not present an unreasonable safety risk, the local 
FAA Manufacturing Inspection District Office will issue a Special Airworthiness 
Certificate in the Experimental Category with operating limitations applicable to the 
particular UAS.”). 
 
171 See Kellington, supra note 38, at 39–40 (“Even under FMRA’s directive, FAA will 
only issue COAs for UAVs to public organizations.  Commercial operators who wish to 
test or use UAVs must either find a public organizational sponsor that will accept 
complete responsibility for the craft and for compliance with the terms of a COA or 
obtain an experimental certificate. . . .  FAA has issued only a handful of experimental 
certificates for very limited flight tests, demonstrations, and training.  FAA states on its 
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207.
172
 
 
[57] Until recently, a debate was quietly brewing over whether the FAA 
had the authority to regulate small UAVs.  One judge had categorized a 
small UAV as a “model aircraft” and outside the FAA’s purview.173  Prior 
to this case, the FAA had requested that modelers adhere to certain 
guidelines, but it had not attempted to regulate models specifically.
174
  
Rather, the Academy of Model Aeronautics (hereinafter “AMA”)—a 
national group of modeling enthusiasts—established standards for model 
aircraft flying.
175
  The AMA generally requires that its members purchase 
liability insurance and comply with the FAA’s recommendations.176 
 
[58] Consistent with this scheme, Congress—in its 2012 “FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act” (hereinafter “FMRA”)—exempted model 
                                                                                                                     
website that it will not issue experimental certificates for UAVs except in very limited 
circumstances”).  
 
172 See Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HRE4-HLT7. 
 
173 See Decisional Order at 7–8, Huerta v. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 
2014), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/Pirker-CP-217.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YK59-EQDB.  
 
174 See R.J. VAN VUREN, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR: MODEL 
AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (1981), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AQB7-J3MT. 
 
175 See ACAD. OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL MODEL AIRCRAFT SAFETY CODE 
(2014), available at http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4WT8-A9DP. 
 
176 See Benefits of this Association, ACAD. OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, 
http://www.modelaircraft.org/membership/membership/overview.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JHA2-CPZ4 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).   
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aircraft from future regulation by the FAA, provided the models meet 
certain criteria.
177
  
 
[59] Recently the FAA began asserting that its Federal Aviation 
Regulations (hereinafter “FARs”)—which govern the operation of 
“aircraft”—also apply to model aircraft. 178   This led to a case that 
ultimately confirmed (for now) the scope of the FAA’s control over all 
forms of UAS.
179
  In Huerta v. Pirker, the FAA sought to fine a paid drone 
operator for allegedly unsafe operations.
180
  At first, an administrative law 
judge determined that the UAS was a “model aircraft” and not within the 
FAA’s regulatory purview.181  If that interpretation had prevailed, it would 
have opened up the sky to small commercial drones.  That case, however, 
was reversed on appeal to the National Transportation Safety Board.
182
  
The Board held that models are “aircraft,” too—and that the FAA’s safety 
regulations applied to UAS (whether drone or model) with equal force.
183
   
                                               
177 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 336(a), 126 Stat. 
11, 77 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
  
178 See Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,172, 36,172 
(June 25, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).  The FARs broadly define “aircraft” 
as “a device that is used for intended to be used for flight in the air.”  14 C.F.R. § 1.1 
(2014).   
 
179 See Opinion and Order at 12, Huerta v. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 17, 
2014) [hereinafter Pirker Opinion and Order], available at 
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9EUN-
VZ9D. 
 
180 See id. at 1–2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014) (stating “[n]o person may operate an 
aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of 
another.”). 
 
181 See id. at 3. 
 
182 See id. at 2, 12. 
 
183 See id. at 12. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 4 
 
39 
 
 
[60] In June 2014, before Pirker was reversed on appeal, the FAA 
released a notice entitled “Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model 
Aircraft.”184  The FAA’s position is consistent with the ultimate result in 
Pirker: it contends that model aircraft (and all UAS or drones) fall within 
the statutory definition of “aircraft” and thus are generally subject to at 
least some existing FAA regulations.
185
   
 
[61] Thus, existing case law (supported by the FAA’s stance) suggests 
that, whether or not a UAV is a “model” aircraft, it will be subject to 
certain existing FAA regulations.  And, going forward, UAVs will only be 
“models” exempt from future, targeted regulation if they are flown for 
recreational purposes.
186
  UAS that are used commercially would not meet 
that definition.
187
  The FAA has clearly established its intent to regulate 
commercial UAS, whatever their size. 
 
[62] One final lens for assessing the framework of developing drone 
regulation comes again from the FAA.  In November 2013 the FAA 
released its “Roadmap for Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems in the National Airspace.” 188   The primary purpose of the 
Roadmap was to “align proposed FAA actions with Congressional 
mandates.”189 
                                               
184 See Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. at 36,172.   
 
185 See id. at 36,173.  
 
186 See id. at 36,173–74. 
 
187 See id. at 36,174. 
 
188 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEMS (NAS) ROADMAP i (1st ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
ROADMAP], available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4XB3-F3HR. 
 
189 Id. at i. 
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[63] The FAA’s Roadmap did little from a practical perspective other 
than arrange six mandated test-sites for UAS research and operation.
190
  
The remainder of the document discussed the unique safety concerns 
posed by UAVs’ presence in our crowed national airspace.191  Principal 
among these is the need to develop “sense and avoid” technologies.192 
However, the Roadmap did propose an instructive timeline for integrating 
drones.  The timeline is quite conservative: the FAA plans to continue 
accommodating UAVs on a case-by-case basis.
193
  The following two 
steps—“integration” and “evolution”—are also expected to take about five 
years each.
194
       
 
[64] Although (as discussed infra) the FAA has since taken steps to 
integrate small UAS into the national airspace, its Roadmap—which 
presumably still applies to larger drones—has faced criticism.  The 
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (“AVUSI”) sent 
a letter to the FAA, noting “AUVSI’s economic impact study found that, 
in the first decade following integration, the UAS industry will create 
more than 100,000 jobs and $82 billion in economic impact.  However, 
each day that integration is delayed will lead to $27 million in lost 
economic impact.”195  
                                               
190 See id. at 37. 
 
191
 See id. at 12. 
 
192 See id. at 28. 
 
193 See ROADMAP, supra note 188, at 21–22.  Notably, however—if the FAA’s 
proposed rules for small UAS are adopted—the case-by-case inquiry will apply only to 
larger drones.  
 
194 See id. at 6, 21.   
 
195 Letter from Michael Toscano, President & CEO, Ass’n for Unmanned Vehicle Sys. 
Int’l, to Michael Huerta, Administrator, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Jan. 27, 2014), available 
at http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/f28f661a-e248-4687-b21d-
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[65] It is difficult to tell what effect the FAA’s conservative timeline 
might have on developing state regulations of civil UAS.  A longer, slower 
process might eliminate some of the urgency to legislate.  On the other 
hand, states will apparently have abundant time to do so—and without 
drones in our skies, it’s unlikely that people will warm up to their benefits.   
 
[66] There is one area in which the FAA has taken reasonable 
preliminary steps towards integration: small UAS.  On February 15, 2015, 
the FAA proposed a framework of regulations governing small UAS.
196
  
The regulations have not yet taken effect; rather, the FAA has solicited 
public commentary through April 24, 2015.
197
  However, the proposed 
rules would exempt UAS meeting certain qualifications from the FAA’s 
case-by-case approval system.
198
  Under the FAA’s proposed rules, UAS 
that weigh less than fifty-five pounds could be flown by licensed 
“operators” during daylight hours at altitudes less than 500 feet.199  While 
line-of-sight operation would still be required under the proposed 
regulations, this is a significant step forward for the commercial use of 
small UAS in the United States.  Unfortunately, in certain states that have 
passed privacy laws restricting private UAS use, the FAA’s action may 
mean little: even if aircraft meet the federal safety standards, it will be 
virtually impossible to fly them lawfully where unauthorized photography 
                                                                                                                     
34342433abdb/UploadedFiles/1%2027%2014%20Letter%20on%20sUAS%20NPRM%2
0Delay.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R8YP-6HQV.  
 
196 See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Propose New Rules for 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9SZ3-C4MB. 
 
197 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
9544. 
 
198 See id. at 9579. 
 
199 See id. at 9576.  
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by UAS is prohibited.  
 
[67] Much as states have, Congress has largely concerned itself with 
protections against law enforcement invasions of privacy.
200
  One 
recurring bill, however, has included civil aircraft within its orbit.  The 
“Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015” would, among 
other things, require any UAS seeking authorization to provide a “data 
collection statement” indicating the focus and purpose of its image-
gathering.
201
  It would also instruct the Secretary of Transportation to 
conduct a UAS privacy study and prepare a report.
202
  While transparency 
in UAS operations might assuage privacy concerns, the administrative 
costs of such a nationwide program are unclear.  The Act also creates a 
private right of action, which includes an attorney’s fee provision and 
could have significant economic impact.
203
 
 
IV.  HOW SHOULD LEGISLATURES ADDRESS PRIVACY? 
 
[68] In the broadest sense, there are three possible approaches to 
dealing with the privacy concerns that drones raise: (1) wait and see, (2) 
adopt a federalist system of regulation, or (3) enact a federal statute.
204
  
Each of these systems has its merits.  Below, the arguments for and 
against the three regulatory schemes are outlined.  It is ultimately 
suggested that the best course of action would be to adopt a carefully 
constructed federal privacy act governing drones.  Such an act might 
                                               
200 See, e.g., Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 
113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 
201 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2015). 
 
202 See id. at § 337(a), (b). 
 
203 See id. at § 4(d). 
 
204 Of course, combinations of these are always an option as well. 
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commission a study, or perhaps propose a baseline of privacy protections, 
while also ensuring that states cannot legislate so as to create a de facto 
ban on UAS over private property.
205
 
 
 A.  The Case for Inaction 
 
[69] The case for waiting on UAV legislation appears to be the least 
favorite among academics,
206
 although it pops up from time to time in the 
news.  Its arguments are not without merit.  The UAV industry is in its 
infancy.  It is impossible to predict all of its privacy implications, and 
therefore enormously difficult to draft conscientious laws that strike the 
proper balance between privacy and progress.
207
  Smartphones have 
already given us a society with ubiquitous, ambulatory cameras, doing 
more to promote civil “surveillance” than drones are likely to do for some 
years to come.  They convey various kinds of personal data to third 
parties, rendering it accessible by the government to search or introduce at 
trial.  Yet few would argue we should outlaw cell phones in the name of 
privacy.  The legislation that states have proposed so far has been 
similarly overbroad, prohibiting far more activity than required to protect 
privacy interests.   
                                               
205 Congress would have to be particularly mindful that any privacy protections do not 
restrict industry growth; the goal would be to assuage the concerns that have led states to 
impose harsher restrictions. 
 
206 One reason for this, I expect, may simply be the fact that an article prophesying 
impending doom is more attractive to publishers than an article suggesting that 
everything is probably fine. 
 
207 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 461 (“[W]hen drafting new laws it is critical to adopt a 
balanced approach that recognizes the inherent difficulty of predicting the future of any 
rapidly changing technology.  In the early days of the Internet and mobile phones, it 
would have been nearly impossible to accurately foresee all of the uses—both positive 
and otherwise—to which these technologies have been applied.  It is similarly difficult 
today to predict exactly how UAS will be used—or even what they will look like—in the 
coming decades.  Although unmanned aircraft pose real and increasingly well recognized 
privacy concerns, they also offer real and much less widely appreciated benefits.”). 
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[70] Moreover, existing laws already provide a framework for 
restricting many improper invasions of privacy by UAS.
208
  It would be 
more reasonable, and less likely to violate the First Amendment right to 
record, if states focused on adjusting existing laws to cover UAS.  This 
way, states would limit only as much UAS activity as necessary to 
conform to existing privacy expectations.
209
   
 
[71] Perhaps the most conclusive argument against the “wait and see” 
option is simply that the ship may have already sailed.  At least forty-three 
states have proposed drone bills, and laws are on the books in at least 
twenty of them.  There might still be hope that states will be more open to 
commercial applications, as only a quarter or so of states have specifically 
addressed private use.
210
  It seems likely, however, that more states will 
take up that cause as it becomes more pressing.
211
  For example, many 
states that addressed only public surveillance forbade the government 
from storing information collected inadvertently, or from using in court 
information about anyone other than the subject of the warrant.
212
  
Presumably those states will want to consider drafting similar restrictions 
for information collected by third-party UAVs. 
 
[72] Another potential problem with such an approach is that, in all 
                                               
208 See, e.g., id. at 498. 
 
209 However, this approach—despite reflecting a more reasonable balancing of interests—
would not make the legal system any less varied or unpredictable.  There are variations 
between states’ existing privacy laws, and there will be variations between the courts’ 
applications of those laws to UAVs.  A uniform system would provide better notice of the 
standard to everyone, and would better enable development. 
 
210 See supra Part III.D. 
 
211 See supra Part III.D. 
 
212 See Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, supra note 98 
(Massachusetts and Rhode Island are two examples).   
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likelihood, it will be very difficult to enforce existing privacy laws against 
improper actors without at least some drone-specific rules on the books.  
UAVs can be light, quiet, and virtually unnoticeable.  They can observe 
from angles one normally would not expect, and see over walls and on 
rooftops.  People who are illegally observed by UAS—for example, in 
violation of a “Peeping Tom” statute—may never know their rights have 
been violated, unless government imposes some restrictions.
213
  
 
B.  Drone Federalism 
 
[73] There are also several arguments in favor of leaving commercial 
drone regulation largely in the hands of the states.  The technology is new, 
and state experimentation might lead to a better result than a federal 
                                               
213 On the other hand, UAS-specific regulations could be just as difficult to enforce 
against private individuals as current privacy laws, conveying no benefit while also 
having a deleterious effect on legitimate business uses for UAVs.  Companies that have 
gone to the expense of hiring a trained and licensed drone “operator” will presumably 
avoid actions that could subject them to civil or criminal liability.  See, e.g., Gregory S. 
McNeal, FAA Has Commercial Drone Regulation Backwards, FORBES (July 1, 2014, 
4:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/07/01/faa-struggling-to-
deal-with-drones-now-going-after-realtors-and-farmers/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7YED-GBW7 (“When a realtor or farmer uses a piece of equipment for 
commercial purposes their livelihood and businesses are on the line, [creating] clear 
incentives for safe operation (not to mention big insurance policies).  They aren’t going 
to fly irresponsibly and push the limits of their equipment because they are working with 
a clear purpose in mind.”).  On the other hand, it will be difficult to regulate the behavior 
of an average individual who bought a drone at the hobby store.  Consider the recent 
White House incident, in which a drunken government worker accidentally breached 
some of the most heavily regulated airspace in the country.  See Michael D. Shear & 
Michael S. Schmidt, White House Drone Crash Described as a U.S. Worker’s Drunken 
Lark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, at A15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L6DA-XCJ5; Charlotte McCoy, AMA Reacts to President Obama: More 
Regulation Wouldn’t Have Prevented White House “Drone” Incident, AMA GOV’T 
RELATIONS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://amablog.modelaircraft.org/amagov/2015/01/28/ama-reacts-to-president-obama-
more-regulation-wouldnt-have-prevented-white-house-drone-incident/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z7SJ-959D. 
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“statute of first impression,” so to speak.214  Privacy—particularly outside 
of law enforcement contexts—has traditionally been a product of state and 
common law.
215
  
 
[74] Margot Kaminski has made a compelling case for drone 
federalism, contending that states are better suited to address the “complex 
space” between the privacy and First Amendment rights at stake. 216  
Kaminski argues that because federal legislation is more costly, more time 
consuming to enact, and more likely to be struck down as unconstitutional, 
states are a better laboratory for experimenting with approaches to 
commercial and private UAS regulation.
217
  Moreover, state legislatures 
are capable of tailoring protections to meet new technologies according to 
their citizens’ particular needs—for example, it should come of no 
surprise that California is one of a few states to pass an anti-paparazzi 
law.
218
 
 
[75]  Another argument made in favor of drone federalism (and privacy 
federalism in general) is that it is difficult for a single federal law to 
foresee each varied situation that may arise in the future.
219
   
 
[76] It is possible that a pure federalism model would work well if—as 
is probably the case for less-controversial areas of the law—states 
cautiously tested the waters of restrictions on civil/commercial drones.  
Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case here; they are diving 
                                               
214 See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 65. 
 
215 See id. at 66. 
 
216 See id. at 59.   
 
217 See id. at 64. 
 
218 See id. at 66.  
 
219 See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 461. 
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straight in.
220
  The specter of drone warfare and robotic monitoring has 
wrought enough damage on drones’ image that, by the time the FAA fully 
integrates private UAS in the national airspace, it may be impossible in a 
significant number of states to operate one without risking civil or 
criminal liability.
221
  As mentioned earlier, as long as the third-party 
doctrine remains viable, the incentive for states to bring civil drone 
restrictions up to speed with moratoria on government surveillance will be 
great.
222
 
 
[77] The states have also done little to demonstrate that they are 
concerned with the “complex space” between the First Amendment and 
privacy.  The Texas Privacy Act, enacted in response to a drone’s 
discovery of environmental violations, arguably violates the First 
Amendment outright.  The cattle industry has sponsored bills in several 
states forbidding the recording of farmland.
223
  Some states, by prohibiting 
flights over private property, appear to be straining to reach as much 
conduct as existing First Amendment precedent could possibly allow.   
 
[78] Moreover, the Supreme Court’s preference against issuing broad 
holdings when privacy and the First Amendment collide suggests that 
even some unconstitutional attempts are unlikely to be overturned in one 
fell swoop.  Instead, courts might invalidate statutes on particular cases’ 
facts.  The result could be that unconstitutional laws persist for some time, 
continuing to infringe on First Amendment rights, eroding rather than 
being overturned. 
                                               
220 See generally supra Section III.D. 
 
221 See Villasenor, supra note 5, at 500–01. 
 
222 See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 66 (noting that one qualification, in order for drone 
federalism to function, is that “Congress must legislatively close the trap door that is the 
third-party . . . doctrine”). 
 
223 See id. at 63 (noting that the cattle industry has been sponsoring bills that criminalize 
video recording on farms). 
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[79] Finally, of the three possible approaches, drone federalism would 
result in the greatest level of interstate variation and legal uncertainty.  
The aviation industry benefited from a consistent federal approach in 
1926, and would again today, to the extent possible.
224
   
 
C.  Federal Regulation of Civil Drones and Privacy 
 
[80] Even if privacy is traditionally within the states’ domain, Congress 
also has a pedigree of privacy laws.  Existing federal privacy laws are 
sectoral, carving out a particular privacy issue; several answer questions 
about the relationship between privacy and technology.  For example, 
federal laws address telephone and electronic communications,
225
 
standards for the electronic exchange of health care information,
226
 and the 
privacy of children’s personal information online.227   An act outlining 
baseline privacy policies for commercial UAS would not be out of place 
on such a list.
228
 
 
[81] In addition, Congress’ passing of the FMRA could suggest a 
                                               
224 Interestingly, today’s argument that privacy is in states’ domain mirrors concerns in 
1926 that federal regulation of safety overreached.   
 
225 See generally Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 
Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No.99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–
22 (2012)). 
 
226 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191 § 261, 
110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) 
 
227 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(6), 6502(a)(1) 
(2012).  
 
228 Because aircrafts are so closely linked with interstate commerce (especially aircraft 
collecting and broadcasting data), I assume, for the purposes of this article, that a federal 
legislative scheme would be permissible under the Commerce Clause.  
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greater appreciation for the social and economic benefits of commercial 
UAV operations than many states currently have.  The FMRA predicated 
the FAA’s continuing funding on efforts to integrate drones into the 
national airspace.
229
  The impetus is there for bipartisan support of a 
drone-friendly Act: having invested in the UAS industry’s economic 
future, it is unlikely Congress would enjoy seeing the market flounder on 
state laws (once the FAA lives up to its part of the bargain). 
 
[82] Finally, that federal legislation is more costly and often requires 
greater deliberation may in fact translate into better results than those 
currently being achieved by the states.  While the extent of the First 
Amendment right to record is far from clear, Congress could establish 
baseline privacy-related rules that would prevent an act from being 
categorically stricken.  And some privacy interests can be vindicated 
without implicating the First Amendment at all, as by enacting 
transparency requirements.
230
  
 
D.  The Potential Contents of a Federal Drone Act 
 
[83] Congress’s goals in drafting privacy rules that would govern 
commercial UAS should include (in no particular order): 
 
1. Providing the clearest possible guidance to potential UAS 
manufacturers, operators, and insurers; 
2. To the extent possible, establishing uniformity in 
permissible commercial or private UAS activities; 
3. Facilitating commerce through enabling the expansion of 
beneficial UAS activities; 
                                               
229 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 216, 126 Stat. 11 
(2012). 
 
230 See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2015).  (But note that the Act’s purview reaches far beyond transparency.) 
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4. Preventing usurpation by states of UAV operators’ First 
Amendment right to information gathering; 
5. Avoiding usurpation (to the extent possible) of states’ 
traditional prerogatives regarding privacy rights; 
6. Protecting individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy 
from unwanted recording; and  
7. Avoiding Constitutional overreach. 
 
[84] Transparency requirements are already being considered by 
Congress.
231
  Transparency in UAV operations—if the actual requirements 
were crafted to avoid administrative costs—could feasibly serve each of 
the above-listed goals.  For instance, anyone seeking to operate a UAV in 
the national airspace could be required to provide a “data collection 
statement” detailing (1) the information to be gathered, and (2) the 
information’s intended use. 232   Companies that receive a grant of 
authorization for a particular model and purpose could also be permitted to 
avoid reapplying, as long as new models were used for the same activities.  
By making information about UAS operators available to the public, the 
government could assuage some of the same privacy concerns as would 
consent requirements (but without running afoul of the First Amendment).  
And exemptions could be made for certain categories of aircraft.
233
 
 
[85] Privacy protections beyond that baseline become trickier.  
Congress could follow the lead of some states and prohibit surveillance of 
individuals in violation of reasonable expectations of privacy.  This would 
certainly serve goal #6, and it likely avoids butting up against the First 
Amendment (goal #7).  The standard it sets, however, is vague and might 
                                               
231 See id. 
 
232 Id. at § 339(a)–(b). 
 
233 The FAA has already proposed a similar scheme in its safety regulations; there is no 
reason that privacy regulations could not also be crafted differently to address different 
classes of technology.  See NPRM, supra n. 8 (considering relaxed regulations for aircraft 
weighing under 4.4 lbs). 
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vary from state to state—hindering goals #1 and 2.  A limited “anti-
paparazzi” provision might work better.  It could prohibit the targeted 
collection, or the transmission in interstate commerce, of certain types of 
private information or images—obscene photographs and the like. 
 
[86] In order to avoid usurping states’ ability to create their own 
privacy standards (goal #5), Congress could expressly disclaim any intent 
to occupy fields outside of drone-specific regulation.
234
   
 
[87] Finally, Congress should exercise care in determining whether and 
how a federal Drone Act might preempt state law.  While a broadly 
preemptive federal privacy statute would be best if market growth and 
efficiency were the only concern, such an approach could have several 
unfortunate consequences.  First, broad preemption would extinguish 
states’ abilities to respond to realistic, emerging privacy concerns not 
addressed federally.
235
  Second, it would virtually ensure that federal rules 
will become dated or “ossified” as technology improves.236  To address 
these concerns, Congress could put a time limit on its rules, or employ a 
single, narrowly preemptive ceiling.  For example, it could establish that 
UAVs legally flying in navigable airspace cannot be prohibited from (1) 
navigating over private property or (2) recording video or images for 
purposes not that will not implicate privacy concerns.  
 
[88] Congress has the will, resources, and impetus to create a baseline 
of federal privacy law governing civil drone use.  It has a history of 
passing bold legislation for the betterment of the aviation industry.  It has 
already mandated that the FAA begin ushering in a profitable, beneficial 
system for UAS operations.  Federal guidance on civil drone use might 
                                               
234 For example, “nothing contained within this Act shall be construed to change the 
operation of state laws, existing or forthcoming . . . .” 
 
235 See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 64–66.  On the other hand, states would remain free 
to rework existing privacy laws so that UAVs fall within their scope. 
 
236 See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J 902, 927–28 (2009). 
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assuage states’ concerns about invasion of privacy, and—better still—
foster a system that welcomes interaction between the two levels of 
government, simultaneously enabling a valuable industry and protecting 
First Amendment rights. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
[89] It will take time for the FAA to achieve meaningful integration of 
commercial drones into the public airspace.
237
  In the meantime, the states 
are ramping up privacy protections that ignore the benefits of unmanned 
aircraft, and infringe on First Amendment rights, in favor of privacy 
interests that may, in fact, be negligible.
238
  This could spell problems for 
the future of drones in the United States—especially when the FAA’s 
conservative approach to safety regulations already has politicians 
concerned about losing our edge over foreign competitors.
239
  Privacy 
advocates’ attitudes stem from fears that—in many cases—exhibit a 
misunderstanding of drones’ profitable uses (and of the burdensome task 
of integrating drones in our airspace).
240
  If states continue to pass laws 
                                               
237 See generally FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub, L. No. 112-95, 126 
Stat. 11 (setting staggered annual and continuing deadlines for the act's integration, e.g., 
certain provisions of the NextGen project requiring an annual update on the progress of 
project implementation). 
 
238 See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 57–61. 
 
239 See Elizabeth Tennyson, Hearing Reveals FAA Behind on NextGen, UAS, 
Consolidation, AOPA (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-
News/2014/February/06/FAA-behind-on-NextGen-UAS-and-consolidation-hearing-
reveals.aspx (”Rep. Bill Shuster, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, warned, ‘[t]he aviation industry was invented in America, and we continue to 
be the world leader in the airline industry and in aviation manufacturing.  But if we’re not 
careful and proactive, we could lose our position as the global leader in aviation, just as 
we’ve fallen behind in other important industries.’”). 
 
240 See supra Part I.  Also, the recent advent of weaponized drones for use in overseas 
warfare contributes to these fears, but has no justifiable connection to policy-making in a 
commercial context. 
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restricting commercial drones, Congress should consider enacting 
legislation to preserve a minimum of protection for both privacy interests 
and UAS’ legitimate right-of-way.   
 
